Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry by Goldberg, Erica R.
Penn State Law eLibrary
Journal Articles Faculty Works
2013
Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause
Inquiry
Erica R. Goldberg
Penn State Dickinson School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation










Courts are proudly resigned to the fact that the probable cause inquiry is “nontechnical.” In order 
to conduct a search or make an arrest, police need to satisfy the probable cause standard, which 
the Supreme Court has deemed “incapable of precise definition or quantification into 
percentages.” The flexibility of this standard enables courts to defer to police officers’ reasonable 
judgments and expert intuitions in unique situations. However, police officers are increasingly 
using investigative techniques that replace their own observational skills with test results from 
some other source, such as drug sniffing dogs, facial recognition technology, and DNA 
matching. The reliability of such practices can and should be quantified, but the vagueness of the 
probable cause standard renders it impossible for judges to determine which error rates are 
inconsistent with probable cause.  
 
This article confronts the intersection between quantifiable evidence and the relentlessly fuzzy 
probable cause standard. It proposes that the probable cause standard be assigned a numerical 
value as a minimum threshold in cases where probable cause is based on mechanistic techniques 
that essentially replace a police officer’s own judgment. The article begins by exploring how the 
police and courts currently apply the probable cause standard, including courts’ confrontations 
with probabilities. It then explains why certain evidence should require quantified error rates to 
establish probable cause and how to properly calculate these error rates. In the final section, the 
article argues that assigning a minimum percentage to probable cause in appropriate 
circumstances would add much needed clarity to the law and protect against systemic abuses. 
                                                          
*
 I am grateful to Colin Miller, Jacob Kreutzer, and Bryan Kreykes for reading drafts of this paper.  I also wish to 







Courts are proudly resigned to the fact that the probable cause inquiry is “nontechnical.”
1
 
In order to conduct a search or make an arrest, a police officer must establish probable cause by 
satisfying a test based on the totality of the circumstances.  Such tests allow for great flexibility 
in the application of facts to the standard.  Adding uncertainty to this flexibility, the actual legal 
standard of probable cause remains undefined.  The Supreme Court has deemed probable cause 
“incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.”
2
  Judges, prosecutors, and 
scholars display varying understandings as to the degree of suspicion that probable cause 
requires.
3
  The deferential standard that reviewing courts apply to probable cause determinations 
further exacerbates the confusion.   
The murkiness of the probable cause standard has many virtues, primarily in situations 
requiring the appraisal of many different facts, some tending towards suspicion and some 
undermining it.  A vague standard allows police to rely on their expertise, intuition, and 
observational skills to decide whether suspicious behavior warrants further action, without the 
constraints of a rigid test.  In complex cases, quantification of the standard by assigning it a 
numerical percentage would obscure the true, qualitative nature of the inquiry and create a false 
sense of precision.
 4 




                                                          
1
 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). 
2
 Id. at 371.  
3
 See infra Part I.B. 
4
 Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming 2012), at 
10–12 (discussing how quantifying probable cause would lead to less accurate probable cause determinations by 
undermining a judge’s logical intuition) . 
5
 See id. at 2 (joking that this is one reason for the refusal to quantify the probable cause standard).  If judges are 
afraid of math, this is perhaps rightfully so.  See infra Part II for a discussion of the difficulties involved in 
incorporating statistical evidence into the probable cause inquiry. 
3 
 
There is a subset of cases, however, where the virtues of the imprecise definition of 
probable cause all but disappear.  Consider a real case where Moose the drug detection dog, 
undergoing a training exercise at a storage facility, alerted to the presence of drugs in one of the 
storage bins where drugs were not planted by the police.
6
  The police sought to obtain a warrant 
to search the locker based solely on Moose’s alert and the fact that that the lessee of the storage 
bin, whose name was given to police after Moose’s alert, had a prior record of drug convictions.
7
  
Whether or not probable cause exists to issue the warrant depends largely on Moose’s reliability, 
which can be quantified based on Moose’s error rate in detecting drugs.   
There are an increasing number of situations, like the one involving Moose, where the 
police rely on machines or tools (such as a dog) to create their suspicion.
8
  As a result, the 
likelihood of criminal activity can be quantified.  In such situations, the virtues of having an 
undefined probable cause standard are outweighed by its vices, including the lack of uniformity 
in application and susceptibility to abuse.  In cases where the critical evidence at issue is 
produced through a mechanistic process, where police essentially outsource their intuition, this 
paper argues that reasonable officers cannot differ greatly on the strength of the evidence, and 
the arguments opposing quantifying the probable cause standard are not compelling.   
Currently, the probable cause inquiry provides room for reasonable officers to differ on 
the strength of their suspicion.  Courts making probable cause assessments consider whether the 
facts and circumstances warrant a person of “reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has 
been or is being committed.”
9
  When a magistrate judge undertakes the probable cause inquiry to 
                                                          
6




 Dogs are considered tools like other machines used by the police or forensic scientists.  See Colin Miller, Hear 
Spot Bark: Washington Court of Appeals Rejects Argument that Dog Barking Constitutes Hearsay, EvidenceProf 
Blog, at, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2007/11/hear-spot-bark-.html. 
9
 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
4 
 
determine whether a warrant should issue, she must decide only if there is a “fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
10
  Later, if contraband or 
evidence of a crime is found, the reviewing court at the criminal trial need only “ensure that the 
magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . [concluding]’ that probable cause existed.”
11
   
At these increasingly deferential levels of inquiry, it is unclear what degree of suspicion 
is required before probable cause can be ratified.
12
  Does a reasonable police officer have to 
“believe” that a crime is being committed by greater than 50%?  And, do we look at whether any 
reasonable officer could believe in the existence of criminal activity by greater than 50%?  Then, 
in defining a “fair probability,” should magistrate judges allow some band of error around their 
own determination of 50% likelihood to provide room for reasonable police officers to differ?  If 
a magistrate judge himself deems that there is an approximately 35% chance that evidence could 
be found in a home, but appreciates that reasonable officers could believe the chance to be 60%, 
should the warrant issue?  Further, does the substantial basis review of a magistrate’s decision 
place an even broader band around a police officer’s greater than 50% belief that a crime is 
occurring so as to allow for reasonable magistrate judges to differ?   
Courts have not confronted these questions.  Yet, as technology progresses, more tools 
are available that replace a police officer’s intuition and judgment with mechanistic findings, 
where the degree of suspicion can and should be quantified.
13
  Courts have determined, for 
example, that both positive alerts from drug sniffing dogs and fingerprint matches are sufficient 
                                                          
10
 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
11
 Id. at 238–39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).  Not all courts fashion these standards 
the same way.  See infra note 7 and Part I.B. 
12
 See infra Part I.B. 
13
 According to one scholar, “[j]ust on the horizon,” are “handheld gun detectors, software protocols that sift through 
e-mails searching for illegal material, or facial recognition technology.”  See Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered 
Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How To Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 411 (2005). 
5 
 
on their own, without any other evidence, to satisfy probable cause.
14
  In order to establish that a 
police officer reasonably relied on these types of techniques, quantifiable error rates are often 
incorporated into the probable cause inquiry.  Some courts have even held that certain 
investigative techniques must be assessed using quantified error rates.
15
  
Once the reliability of practices like drug sniffing dogs, fingerprint analysis, partial DNA 
matching,
16
 or facial recognition technology is quantified, however, the vagueness of the 
probable cause standard renders it impossible to determine which, if any, error rates are 
inconsistent with probable cause.  Police cannot predict whether a particular investigative 
technique is reliable enough on its own to satisfy the probable cause inquiry.  Judges do not 
know if probable cause requires a 40%, 50%, or 51% likelihood that a suspect has committed or 
will commit a particular crime.
17
  Our privacy rights vary not only because judges and police 
officers assess facts differently, an unavoidable and often beneficial consequence of a system 
administered by human beings, but because they are using different legal standards.  This creates 
a system prone to inconsistency and vulnerable to abuse. 
                                                          
14
 See, e.g., United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It is undisputed that a drug 
sniffing dog’s detection of contraband in itself establishes probable cause for a search warrant.”); People v. Moon, 
2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 745, No. 09-3106 (Ill. App. Ct. Apr. 26, 2011), at *7 (“The evidence at trial 
established that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant when they determined that the kitchen window was 
the point of entry, gathered finger and palm prints from the outside of the kitchen window that was behind a storm 
window, determined that the prints belonged to defendant and ascertained from Turner that she did not know 
defendant or give him permission to enter her residence.”); United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir. 
1982) (holding that a drug sniffing dog's positive alert to the smell of contraband in luggage “itself establish[es] 
probable cause, enough for the arrest, more than enough for the stop.”). 
15
   Recently, the Florida Supreme Court held that a positive alert by a certified drug sniffing dog does not 
presumptively establish probable cause to conduct a search, and accuracy rates are needed to assess a dog’s 
reliability.  Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 758–59.   This decision is under review by the Supreme Court.  See infra 
Part I.C.  See also State v. Anez, 108 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 28 (Oh. Ct. Common Pl. 2000) (excluding evidence of a 
field breath sobriety test because “the results of a scientific test may not be introduced unless there is foundational 
testimony that the device used was operating with a sufficient degree of accuracy”). 
16
 DNA matching is most relevant to the probable cause inquiry in the context of partial matching of DNA found at a 
crime scene to DNA in a databank, thus implicating possible family members of the person whose DNA has been 
stored in the databank.  See Part II.B.  See generally Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA 
Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2010).   
17
 Some judges have held that probable cause is satisfied even when error rates were between 40% and 50%.  See 
United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007) (probable cause established despite dog’s error rate 
close to 50%).   
6 
 
This article argues that when quantifiable evidence is the primary basis for an officer’s 
suspicion, that evidence should be held to a minimum threshold of required certainty.  Although 
scholars have touched upon whether fallible tools like drug sniffing dogs and facial recognition 
technology can yield evidence that satisfies the probable cause standard
18
 and have debated the 
appropriate level of flexibility with which probable cause should be defined,
19
 this article 
confronts the intersection of probabilistic evidence and the probable cause standard and proposes 
assigning a numerical value to the probable cause standard in cases where error rates are largely 
dispositive of the probable cause inquiry.   
Part I of the article details how the police and courts currently apply the concept of 
probable cause, and how the increasingly deferential standard of review used to assess probable 
cause contributes to the standard’s elusiveness.  Part I also explores how probabilistic evidence is 
currently incorporated into the probable cause inquiry.  Part II contends that certain evidence 
should demand quantified error rates to establish probable cause.  This section argues that 
statistical evidence is necessary to establish probable cause for investigative techniques that 
essentially replace a police officer’s own judgment, skill, and intuition.  Part II further analyzes 
how to calculate error rates in a way most relevant to the probable cause inquiry and exposes the 
limitations of quantification of evidence. 
                                                          
18
 Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth Amendment Rights in Public 
Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 459–62 (2011) (discussing the “tolerable rate of error” in the context of drug 
sniffing dogs, field sobriety tests, and facial recognition technology); Richard E. Myers, Detector Dogs and 
Probable Cause, 14 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 1, 12–18 (2006) (using Bayes’ Rule to demonstrate that a positive alert by 
a drug sniffing dog cannot be sufficient on its own to establish probable cause). 
19
 See, e.g., Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 586 (2007) (“Mathematics . . 
. will fail us in our pursuit of a definition for probable cause, and, indeed, we should fear any attempt to co-opt 
mathematical concepts to solve the probable cause riddle.”); Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds 
on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279 (2004) (exploring the tension between the precision of mathematics and the 
appeal of intuition in defining the probable cause standard and creating a “tiered model of the levels of certainty 
required for probable cause”); Kerr, supra note 4 (arguing that probable cause should not be quantified); Joseph D. 
Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
465, 497(1984) (preferring a “commonsense approach to probable cause”). 
7 
 
In the final section, the article addresses how courts might incorporate quantifiable 
evidence into the probable cause inquiry.  In cases where quantifiable evidence is the critical 
factor in satisfying probable cause, assigning a numerical value to probable cause would add 
uniformity to the law and would better protect Fourth Amendment interests.  In cases where 
quantifiable evidence is presented along with other qualitative evidence tending towards 
suspicion, judges can qualitatively assess any suspicion created by a police officer’s 
observational skills, but will know whether or not the quantifiable evidence comes close to 
meeting the probable cause hurdle.  Finally, when quantifiable evidence is not presented as part 
of the probable cause inquiry, judges can adhere to prior caselaw without quantifying the inquiry.  
While confronting the arguments against quantifying probable cause, the final section further 
offers insights into selecting a number that is easy to conceptualize and proposes alternative 
solutions to quantifying probable cause. 
I. THE ELUSIVE PROBABLE CAUSE INQUIRY 
 
“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”
20
  The probable cause standard is so significant 
because it serves as the gatekeeper between individuals and these unwarranted intrusions.  Yet, 
the standard has not been defined with sufficient precision.
21
  An examination of the role that 
probable cause plays in regulating governmental intrusions of various types is first necessary to 
understand why probable cause requires flexibility in applying the facts but greater precision in 
defining the legal standard.   
                                                          
20
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
21
 See infra Part II.C. 
8 
 
The standard’s elusiveness is exacerbated by relatively recent decisions diminishing judicial 
review of probable cause determinations.  Quantifying the standard is now a more urgently 
needed solution.  Although the Supreme Court has held that the probable cause standard is 
incapable of quantification, courts already incorporate quantifiable evidence into the inquiry; 
they are just not doing so in a standardized way.   
 
A. Probable Cause as the Referee Between Privacy and Security  
In the Fourth Amendment context, probable cause is particularly important because it 
resolves the ubiquitous tension between individual liberty and public security/crime prevention.  
Serious intrusions on privacy and liberty are unconstitutional when undertaken without probable 
cause, and the evidence obtained as a result of the intrusion is often suppressed at trial.
22
   If 
probable cause exists, however, the need to protect the public and enforce the laws permits more 
serious intrusions.  
Probable cause serves as the referee between privacy and security because the Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals only from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
23
  In defining 
whether a search or arrest is reasonable, courts look to the degree of suspicion motivating the 
police and the degree of intrusion into the individual’s privacy or liberty.  For full searches and 
arrests by the police, probable cause is usually the requisite level of suspicion.
24
  To establish 
probable cause, police need not demonstrate a certainty that criminal activity is afoot, or that 
evidence will be found in a particular place, but only a “fair probability” of a successful search or 
                                                          
22
 The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment be excluded from 
admission at trial, although the exclusionary rule has several exceptions.  See United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 
916 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing the exclusionary rule and “its limits”). 
23
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
24
 See United States v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 876 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The test for 





  This fair probability remains a mystery, but courts have consistently held that probable 
cause “exists if a law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, has 
sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable 
caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed . . . .”
26
 
The most serious intrusions into an individual’s privacy require not only probable cause, 
but the prior blessing of the courts.  This court intervention provides extra protection against 
unreasonable searches because a neutral magistrate judge is deemed more capable of making a 
probable cause determination than a police officer, who has a stake in the outcome of each 
case.
27
  Searches or arrests that occur inside an individual’s home
  
require a magistrate judge to 
render the probable cause determination and issue a warrant prior to the search or seizure.
28
       
Other types of searches are considered intrusive enough to require probable cause, but 
exigencies or diminished expectations of privacy render it unnecessary for the police to first 
obtain a warrant.  The “automobile exception” permits police to search a vehicle on a public road 
without a warrant, so long as probable cause is satisfied.
29
  Arrests in public are permissible 
without a warrant.
30
  Police make these probable cause determinations themselves, but they are 
reviewed later if evidence found as a result of the search is used in a criminal trial.
31
 
                                                          
25
 See Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156–57 (2nd Cir. 2007) (discussing the probable cause standard). 
26
 United States v. Gagnon, 373 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 2004).  
27
 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 353 (1986) (“By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause . . . be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime, we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
28
 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (“In no quarter does the Fourth Amendment apply with 
greater force than in our homes, our most private space which, for centuries, has been regarded as 'entitled to special 
protection.'”) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006)); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 
(1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, 
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”).  The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment 
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
29
 See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (discussing the “automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement”). 
30




B. The Role Of Probable Cause When Less Suspicion is Required 
Although probable cause is the critical standard for the most intrusive searches, there are 
other categories of searches and seizures that are constitutionally permitted based on less 
suspicion or justification.  Even in these contexts, however, the probable cause standard is 
important, either for setting the bar against which courts measure “reasonable suspicion,” the 
level of suspicion needed for less intrusive searches, or for preventing intrusions that are not 
considered searches from becoming full searches.   
A “reasonable suspicion” justifies brief detentions and superficial pat-downs of individuals 
over their clothing,
 32
 searches of students in public schools,
33
 and searches of parolees’ homes.
34
  
Because lesser degrees of suspicion are also considered “not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced 
to a neat set of legal rules,’”
35
 courts define reasonable suspicion in relation to probable cause.  
Reasonable suspicion requires some degree of certainty that is less than probable cause, but that 
can be articulated by the police.
36
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a public place without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the individual committed a felony.”) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). 
31
 More information on how courts review probable cause determinations is presented infra Part I.C. 
32
 United States v. Madrid, 30 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing a stop permitted by the Supreme Court 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which "involve[es] only a brief, non-intrusive detention and frisk for weapons 
when officers  have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed a crime or is about to do so”). 
33
 Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358, 370 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Under the ‘special needs’ doctrine, a search 
of a particular student, with the exception of drug testing, must be supported by reasonable suspicion. . . .”)  
34
 See United States v. Loney, 331 F.3d 516, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is now beyond question that a state statute 
survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny if it authorizes searches of parolees based on a reasonable suspicion that an 
individual is violating the terms or conditions of parole. . . .”) 
35
 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).  A survey of 
166 federal judges in 1981 revealed that they quantified reasonable suspicion at an average certainty of 31%.  
See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982).   
36
 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (holding that the certainty needed to satisfy reasonable 
suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence” and less than the “fair 
probability” needed to satisfy probable cause). In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Supreme Court 
explained that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity and less reliable 
than that required to show probable cause.  
11 
 
Other types of government intrusions, due to heightened governmental interests or 
diminished privacy interests, either require no individualized suspicion or are not even 
considered searches that implicate Fourth Amendment protections.
 37
  In those cases, the 
probable cause inquiry prevents the police from converting a superficial intrusion into a greater 
intrusion.   
One category of non-search that has great import for the probable cause inquiry, because it 
yields results that are usually more susceptible to quantification, is the so-called “binary search.” 
A binary search reveals only the presence or absence of illegal substances.
38
  The Supreme Court 
has held that individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband, so 
intrusions that reveal only the presence or absence of drugs, if conducted in ways that do not 
seriously implicate privacy interests, do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
39
  When the 
police test a small amount of white powder for cocaine, for example, it is not considered a search 
or a seizure.
40
  The police may also use drug sniffing dogs to search for scents in public places, 
such as outside a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop
41
 or the exterior of luggage at an airport,
42
 
without implicating Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  
                                                          
37
 See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding mandatory urinalysis tests of 
employees who work for the United States Customs Service); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1985) 
(upholding school’s suspicionless testing of student athletes). 
38
 The term “binary” refers to the fact that the search reveals either a “yes” or a “no” answer to the question of 
whether illegal substances are present and does not reveal any other potentially personal information.  See generally 
Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the World Safe for Binary 
Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411 (2005).  
39
 Binary searches may trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny if performed in a particularly intrusive way.  The 
Supreme Court is now considering whether a dog sniff outside someone’s porch is considered a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  See Florida v. Jardines, No. 11-564, docket at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-564.htm. 
40
 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a 
particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”).  
41
 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).   
42
 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[W]e conclude that the particular course of investigation that 
the agents intended to pursue here -- exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a 
trained canine -- did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).  Part of the rationale 
for Place was that a sniff of a closed suitcase did not reveal the contents of that suitcase, and was therefore 
minimally intrusive.  Id. at 706–07.  
12 
 
The major intrusion from using binary technology occurs after the technology has produced a 
positive alert.  Police either conduct a full search themselves or obtain a warrant from a 
magistrate judge on the basis of the positive alert, but probable cause must be satisfied.  Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment Analysis requires the judge to determine whether the positive alert 
provides the police with probable cause to search further.  A “false positive”
43
 alert to an area 
that does not contain drugs may ultimately reveal items and information in which individuals do 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and forces individuals to submit to prolonged 
interaction with the police.
44
     
The probable cause standard thus protects the public from serious intrusions upon privacy, 
sets a standard against which reasonable suspicion is measured, and prevents binary searches 
from automatically becoming full scale searches.  However, at all levels of review, the level of 
confidence needed to satisfy the probable cause standard is unknown, rendering it vulnerable to 
erosion and abuse.   
 
C. Uncertainty in the Probable Cause Standard Throughout the Stages of Review 
Currently, courts apply a “nontechnical conception”
45
 of probable cause at all levels of 
review, allowing for flexibility in application of the standard but providing little guidance for 
police officers and magistrate judges.  The result is, as one scholar noted, that “although the 
Court has stressed the importance of a ‘single uniform standard’ of probable cause for criminal 
investigatory conduct, it has not defined that standard in a manner that is particularly 
                                                          
43
 A false positive occurs when the search technology indicates the presence of criminal activity incorrectly.  For a 
more detailed explanation, see infra Part II. 
44
 For this reason, Justice Souter dissented in Illinois v. Caballes, which held that the use of drug sniffing dogs at 
routine traffic stops is not a search.  See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The 
infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.”). 
45
 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
13 
 
illuminating to those charged with enforcing and interpreting the criminal law.”
46
  Relatively 
recent developments in Fourth Amendment law have compounded this problem, because they 
have undermined judicial review of probable cause determinations, making it even more 
necessary to clarify the standard. 
As mentioned above, law enforcement officers must make practical commonsense judgments 
in areas of uncertainty, when they do not know if a suspect is actually committing a crime.  
Because police officers are not, as the Supreme Court often reminds us, “legal technicians,”
47
  
the probable cause standard must allow police officers to make educated guesses.  If such a guess 
is reasonable but incorrect, and the police ultimately find either no evidence of the criminal 
activity they were looking for or evidence of entirely unrelated criminal activity,
48
 then the 
standard must also provide room for courts to defer to a police officer’s expertise,
49




To accommodate the myriad interactions between police and individuals without creating 
rules that unduly stifle a police officer’s exercise of her intuition, courts generally assess 
probable cause using a totality of the circumstances approach.
 51
  This flexibility allows courts to 
take all of the facts into account and make an intuitive judgment when issuing a warrant or 
upholding a search instead of having to strictly adhere to rigid rules about what constitutes 
                                                          
46
 Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1385, 1436 n. 172 (1994).  
Professor Ronald Bacigal had described probable cause as a “fixed, but undefined, percentage.”  Ronald J. Bacigal, 
Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L.J. 279, 324 (2004). 
47
 Id. at 231-32. 
48
 See United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Probable cause requires only a probability or 
substantial chance of criminal activity, rather than an actual showing of such activity.”) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
49
 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (“[O]ur cases have recognized that a police officer may draw 
inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.”).  According to the Supreme 
Court in Ornelas, “[w]here a layperson might conclude that a “loose panel below the back seat armrest in [an] 
automobile . . . may suggest only wear and tear, to [a police officer], who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for 
narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be secreted inside the panel.”  
50
 See supra Part I.A. 
51





   For example, the totality of the circumstances test that governs whether an 
informant’s tip can supply probable cause balances factors like the reliability of the informant, 
the basis for the informant’s information, and the extent to which the police have corroborated 
the tip.
53
  A judge may disregard the fact that a confidential informant’s criminal record or drug 
addiction undermines her reliability if other factors point towards her truthfulness.
54
  There are 
many ways to interpret the same set of facts, and an innocent explanation for the evidence 
presented does not necessarily negate probable cause.
55
   
With great flexibility, however, comes great uncertainty.
56
  The Supreme Court has 
remarked that “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular 
[warrant] affidavit establishes probable cause.”
57
  Scholars have noted “wildly different 
outcomes” based on similar fact patterns when determining probable cause and reasonable 
suspicion.
58
  Part of the problem is that no one knows how high a hurdle the standard actually 
presents.  The Supreme Court explicitly refuses to assign probable cause a numerical value, 
equating it instead to a “fair probability” that evidence will be found.  Judges, scholars, and 
                                                          
52
 Professor Richard Bacigal noted that scholars opposed to prescribing precise mathematical rules to govern the 
probable cause inquiry “prefer to trust the subjective judgment of experienced decision makers who evaluate each 
individual situation in light of accumulated experience” and “rely on perceptions that they cannot articulate as 
explicit rules or mathematical probabilities.” Bacigal, supra note 17, at 305. 
53
 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983). 
54
 United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 415 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The magistrate was thus presented with specific 
details of a crime; neither Brown's drug addiction nor criminal record warranted disregarding her report. Although 
an informant's reliability is a factor to be considered by a court, it is just one relevant consideration in the totality of 
the circumstances analysis.”). 
55
 United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985). 
56
 See Bacigal, supra note 19, at 339 (discussing the “unacceptable complexity of balancing the totality of the 
circumstances”).  See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-
Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 238  (2010) (“The tension between the need for legal certainty and 
predictability, on the one hand, and the desire for flexible, equitable, individualized solutions on the other, is as old 
as law itself.”) 
57
 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). 
58
 See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the 
Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 120–22 (1999) (“In a high crime area, 
sitting in a car in a parking lot late at night may create reasonable suspicion [to detain someone] in Georgia, but not 
in Tennessee, and standing on a street corner may create reasonable suspicion in Louisiana, but not in 
Pennsylvania, even though these jurisdictions apply the same standard.”). 
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practitioners hold varying views as to the burden imposed by probable cause, with the largest 
number of judges clustering in the range between 30% and 60%.
59
   Disagreement among 
scholars and practitioners even exists as to whether probable cause is a lighter or equivalent 
burden to the preponderance of the evidence standard.
 60
       
The recognition that reasonable minds may easily differ on whether probable cause is 
satisfied often makes reviewing courts loathe to second-guess probable cause determinations by 
either the police or magistrate judges.
61
  This has led to increasingly deferential review of 
probable cause decisions, which then in turn contributes to the elusiveness of the probable cause 
standard.   For example, in the case of searches where a warrant is required, the warrant 
application by the police must contain information allowing a police officer of reasonable 
caution to believe that evidence will be found in the place to be searched.  Then, the magistrate 
judge must find that, “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
62
  Great 
                                                          
59
 The survey of 166 federal judges in 1981, mentioned supra note 35, revealed that they quantify “probable cause to 
believe,” on average, at 44.52%. Two judges even associated probable cause with 10% and one judge with 90%. See 
McCauliff, supra note 35, at1327-28.  Most of the judges believed probable cause was around 40% or 50%, but 52 
of the judges thought probable cause was either around 30% or around 60%.  Id. 
60
 See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 3.2(e), at 62-82 (3d ed. 
1996) (discussing cases and commentaries indicating that probable cause does not mean “more probable than not); 
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 329 (2008) 
(describing probable cause as “a level of certainty akin to the civil preponderance standard); John H. Blume, Sheri 
L. Johnson, and Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt, and the 
Right To Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1104 n. 240 (2007) (“Probable cause does not mean more 
probable than not); Note, Legislating the Fourth Amendment: Can Congressional Legislation Make the 
Unconstitutional Legal?, 50 HOW. L.J. 899, 901 (2007) (“[A] more detailed, modern version of probable cause 
would not necessarily require a more likely than not scenario.”)  One particular federal prosecutor told his 
supervisee that probable cause meant 40%, see Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment: 
Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 680 (2005), but 
an attorney for the FBI believed that “probable cause meant more likely than not, or, if quantified, a 51% 
likelihood.” See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 
749, 783 (2003). A plurality of the Supreme Court has stated that the probable cause standard “does not demand any 
showing that such a belief [of criminal wrongdoing] be correct or more likely true than false.” See Tex. v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
61
 See id. (holding that a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant is entitled to “great deference” due to the strong 
preference for warrants and the reality of “doubtful or marginal case[s]”). 
62
 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (2005)). 
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deference is later given to the magistrate’s issuance of a warrant by a reviewing court,
63
 which 
determines whether the magistrate’s decision is supported by “a substantial basis.”
64
 
This deference, combined with a vague standard, does not promote uniformity in 
magistrate judges’ decisions.
65
  The deference might be appropriate if reviewing courts were 
simply deferring to a magistrate judge’s assessment as to whether the facts at issue, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, surpassed a known probable cause threshold.   However, because 
the probable cause hurdle is so vague, reviewing courts cannot know the degree of suspicion on 
which the magistrate judge relied in issuing a warrant.
66
  Is that magistrate basing his ruling on 
the fact that a reasonable officer has to believe that evidence will be found by greater than 50%, 
and a “fair probability” determination by the magistrate judge allows for some room for 
disagreement among police reasonable officers?
67
  Reviewing courts, which decide whether a 
                                                          
63
 See United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A magistrate’s determination of probable cause is 
entitled to great deference by reviewing courts.”)  
64
 Id. (“[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for concluding 
that probable cause existed.”).  See also United States v. McClellan, 350 Fed. Appx. 767, 769 (3d Cir. 2009)  
(“Our review of the initial probable cause determination, however, is deferential as we scrutinize the affidavit to 
determine if there is a substantial basis for a fair probability that the wiretaps would obtain communications 
regarding illegal drug transactions.”) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Reed, 195 Fed. Appx. 815, 822 
(10th Cir. 2006) (“A reviewing court should accord great deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable 
cause; its duty is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that probable cause 
existed. This deference is appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for warrants.”). 
65
 The Supreme Court has warned against too much deference to a trial court’s probable cause determination, 
remarking that “[a] policy of sweeping deference would permit, in the absence of any significant difference in the 
facts, the Fourth Amendment's incidence [to] tur[n] on whether different trial judges draw general conclusions that 
the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause.’ Such varied results would be inconsistent with 
the idea of a unitary system of law.”  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996). 
66
 In his excellent piece on the tension between a statistical versus an intuitive approach to probable cause, Richard 
Bacigal argues that the Supreme Court has maintained the “fiction” that probable cause is a “single, uniform 
standard” that applies equally to every crime.  According to Bacigal, “[t]his rigid view of probable cause requires 
the police to pinpoint their level of certainty to some fixed, but undefined, percentage.”  Bacigal, supra note 19, at 
391. 
67
 At least one court has even conflated the standards at various levels of review, holding that probable cause exists 
if a reasonable person could “believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be 
found in a particular place.”  See United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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“substantial basis” supports the magistrate’s decision,
68
 do not even know how much suspicion 
the magistrate believed was required before rendering his decision.    
The probable cause standard’s imprecision at various levels of review is also partially 
responsible for the “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule,
 69
 which, in turn, contributes 
to the indeterminacy of the standard.  Although the exclusionary rule requires the “fruits” of 
unlawful searches to be suppressed at trial, the good faith exception permits the admission of 
evidence found pursuant to a search warrant not supported by probable cause, so long as law 
enforcement reasonably relied on the warrant.
70
  A reviewing court can therefore find under 
certain circumstances that even if a substantial basis did not exist for the magistrate’s 
determination, any evidence found may still form the basis of a criminal conviction.
71
  The good 
faith exception means all evidence found pursuant to a warrant will be admitted unless the 




The good faith exception thus almost entirely insulates a magistrate judge’s issuance of a 
warrant from review at the trial or appellate levels.  Many reviewing courts simply find that the 
good faith exception applies without considering whether the warrant was supported by probable 
                                                          
68
 See supra Introduction. 
69
 Police are permitted to rely on a search warrant, even if later found lacking in probable cause, where a search 
warrant affidavit "provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to 
the existence of probable cause.”  Farma, 785 F.2d at 838.   
70
 The Supreme Court has held that the good faith exception does not apply to a search warrant if the police lied to 
procure the warrant, or the warrant was so lacking in probable cause that the magistrate judge essentially abdicated 
her duty and rubber-stamped a warrant request. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921–24 (1983) 
(“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence 
of Fourth Amendment violations.”).  
71
 United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002) (allowing the admission of evidence even if “it is clear 
that . . .  Agent Peterson’s affidavit does not provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable 
cause”). 
72





  This stymies the development of the law surrounding the probable cause standard in 
favor of admission of a great deal more evidence.
74
  Given that the review of a magistrate judge’s 
probable cause determinations is already so deferential, it is difficult to determine in a particular 
case if probable cause is actually lacking unless it is so obviously lacking that a court must 
exclude the evidence despite the good faith exception. 
Although one scholar has found that searches conducted pursuant to warrants are much 
more likely to produce evidence than searches conducted where no warrant is required,
75
 Leon’s 
good faith exception and its progeny
76
 may lead to an erosion of the protections that warrants 
offer.
 77
  The good faith exception now focuses on what a reasonable officer would believe, not 
whether the probable cause standard was actually met based on the warrant application,
78
 thereby 
bypassing the magistrate’s oversight as intermediary between law enforcement’s own 
determination of probable cause and the resulting search.
79
  
The uncertainty in the probable cause standard, combined with the exceptional deference 
offered to the initial probable cause determination, can easily be exploited by unscrupulous or 
                                                          
73
See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A court may consider whether the good-
faith exception applies before conducting probable cause analysis.”). 
74
 Indeed, as the dissent in Leon predicted, “After today's decisions, there will be little reason for reviewing courts to 
conduct such a conscientious review [of the probable cause determination]; rather, these courts will be more likely 
to focus simply on the question of police good faith.”  Id. at 956 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
75
 One scholar examined available empirical data to conclude that searches pursuant to warrants recover evidence at 
rates that may exceed 80%.  The recovery rate on warrantless searches, even when police allege probable cause, is 
significantly less, perhaps as low as 12%. Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back Into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 913, 923-928 (2009).  
76
See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (extending Leon’s good faith exception to a situation where 
police negligence led to an arrest pursuant to a revoked warrant). 
77
 See, e.g., Houston, 665 F.3d at 995–96 (upholding police officers’ reliance on a search warrant based on the 
“common sense appeal” of the inference that because defendant molested a child and looked at child pornography 
six years ago, he might have child pornography on his current computer at a different location). 
78
 In fact, in applying the good faith exception, some courts consider information known to the police officer that 
was inadvertently omitted from the warrant application.  United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 460–61 
(4th Cir. 2011). 
79
 See United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 413 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing the “far less reliable procedure of 
an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar 
shortcomings of hindsight judgment”). 
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overextended police officers and magistrate judges,
80
 who will not be second-guessed.  Given the 
lack of oversight over probable cause decisions, the flexibility afforded by the current application 
of the probable cause standard may not always be a virtue, and may place too much discretion in 
the hands of police officers at the expense of privacy interests.
81
  According to Professor Richard 
Bacigal, “[t]he inability to formulate clear rules or precise probability levels governing probable 
cause has lead the Court to adopt one over-arching rule for the police -- just use your common 
sense and act reasonably.”
82
  To some extent, this standard contravenes the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, which is to limit police discretion.
83
  Although reasonableness is part of the 
standard, an undefined legal hurdle leads to variability in how much suspicion is deemed 
“reasonable,” allowing for perhaps unjustified amounts of police discretion. 
While there is ample reason to allow great flexibility in application of the facts to the 
probable cause standard, there is less justification for preserving a vague, undefined legal 
standard.  This is especially true because courts are already incorporating probabilities into the 
probable cause inquiry.      
 
                                                          
80
 Although many scholars assume that most police officers would not abuse their power to establish probable cause, 
empirical evidence indicates a serious problem with perjury in warrant affidavits.  See Steven W. Gard, Bearing 
False Witness: Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 445, 447–48 (2008).  
Clarifying the probable cause standard or applying a more stringent standard of review would not solve the problem 
of perjury, but it would impede police’s attempts to establish probable cause where none exists, which police might 
prefer to outright lying. 
81
 Scholars have commented that the cynical explanation for flexible or inconsistent Fourth Amendment standards is 
to make it easier for police to conduct searches without worrying about constitutional protections.  See, e.g., Susan 
F. Maniberg, Who is the Reasonable Person: Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in the Supreme 
Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1525 (2010) (“So why should 
police not be held to higher standards suitable to the trained professionals they presumably are? . . .  The cynical 
answer is that lower courts would be more likely to find a Fourth Amendment or Miranda violation if police were 
held to a higher standard . . . than is currently the case.”).  
82
 Bacigal, supra note 19, at 318. 
83
 Id. at 320.   
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D. Confrontations with Probability 
Part of the reason that courts are loathe to attach rules or numbers to the probable cause 
inquiry is a concern that a “probabilistic” approach to probable cause would replace detective 
work that yields individualized suspicion.
84
  This type of probabilistic approach, some fear, 
would penalize people based on group attributes instead of individual characteristics.
85
  Yet, this 
is not the only way probabilities have been incorporated into the probable cause inquiry.  Courts 
also review probabilities relevant to individualized suspicion, which is not as problematic as 
finding probable cause based on group statistics.  These two types of probabilistic evidence—
data which measures group attributes and data which measures individualized suspicion—have 
different roles in the probable cause inquiry, and both illustrate how statistical evidence is 
evaluated by courts in assessing probable cause. 
1. Background attributes and group statistics   
Many courts and scholars have expressed an aversion to using non-individualized statistical 
information to sanction intrusive police conduct or treat people as potential criminals.
86
  For 
example, presence in a high crime area is not sufficient by itself to justify stopping an individual 
                                                          
84
 See Bacigal, supra note 19, at 297 (“An unavoidable feature of probabilistic thinking is that it treats people as 
members of a group rather than as individuals. Some commentators suggest that this focus violates an ethical 
command to treat citizens as unique individuals and to judge them only on evidence about their own conduct or 
matters within their own control.”).  See also See also William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE 
L.J. 2137, 2164 (2002) (“Current Fourth Amendment law discourages group seizures. . . . Aggregate justifications 
[where] no one person is reasonably suspected, but the odds are high that some members of the group are criminals -
- do not suffice.").   
85
 Bacigal, supra note 19, at 295–97.  See also David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 451 (2003) 
(Group guilt can be both immensely powerful and deeply troubling when used to punish people or focus suspicion 
on them merely for their associations . . . .”). 
86
 Raymond, supra note 58, at 105–06 (discussing a hypothetical where one in three individuals in a certain area is 
likely to possess drugs and arguing that, although this probability likely satisfies reasonable suspicion, “reasonable 
suspicion would not exist as to each individual in the neighborhood).  According to Raymond, “[s]ome 
particularized observations-proof that implicates an identified individual -must also be offered in support of the 
claim of reasonable suspicion.”  Id. 
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on the theory that most people in that area are engaged in criminal activity.
87
   Courts do not 
want to punish individuals for where they live, or for the demographic groups to which they 
belong.  However, presence in a high crime area can be considered as a relevant factor in 
determining whether the police have reasonable suspicion, a lower hurdle than probable cause,
88
 
to briefly detain someone.
89
   
It is in such situations that courts consider group statistics on criminality within an area.  
Although one scholar has noted that most courts are content to rely on “an officer’s testimony 
that an area is a ‘high-crime area’ without much analysis as to the basis of that conclusion,”
90
 
some courts have required prosecutors to provide quantitative evidence demonstrating presence 
the existence of a high crime area.
91
  Courts must then review statistical evidence on whether a 
particular location is either a high crime area or undergoing a crime wave with respect to the 
criminal activity at issue.
92
 
Group statistics have also been used when assessing the efficacy of random searches and 
seizures that do not require a showing of probable cause, to determine whether these intrusions 
are reasonable.  Sobriety roadbloacks, airport screening programs, and the practice of ordering 
motorists to exit their vehicle during traffic stops have all been assessed using percentages of 
                                                          
87
 Brown v. Tex., 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, 
standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.”). 
88
 See supra Part I.B. 
89
  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics 
of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”).   
90
 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area" Question: Requiring Verifiable and 
Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U.L. REV. 1587, 1607 (2008). 
91
 See United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 215–16 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding not “clearly erroneous” the district 
court’s determination that a location could not be categorized as a high crime area where “an average of 1.3 arrests 
were made per week near the place of the stop and that the majority of these were for misdemeanor or summary 
offenses” due to the large number of people who frequent the area); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 
1122, 1139 n. 32 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring district courts to “examine with care the specific data underlying any 
such assertion [of the existence of a high crime area])."  For a detailed analysis of how courts have attempted to 
standardize quantification of statistics relevant to the existence of a high crime area, see Ferguson, supra note 90, 
at1607–23. 
92
 See United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (articulating the test for determining if a 
neighborhood’s crime profile can contribute to reasonable suspicion). 
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criminal activity found per search or seizure.
93
  In Delaware v. Prouse,
94
 the Supreme Court 
invalidated random stops made by the Delaware Highway Patrol in part because “no empirical 
evidence indicated that such stops would be an effective means of promoting roadway safety.”
 95
  
Later, distinguishing Prouse, the Supreme Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint pilot program 
where “the detention of each of the 126 vehicles that entered the checkpoint resulted in the arrest 
of two drunken drivers.  Stated as a percentage, approximately 1.5 percent of the drivers passing 
through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment.”
96
     
It is important to note that statistics that measure the likelihood of criminality within a certain 
group, like the ones mentioned above, are usually insufficient to satisfy probable cause, which is 
a much higher bar than reasonable suspicion.  Satisfying probable cause almost always requires 
some individualized suspicion.
97
  As one court of appeals held, “[s]tanding alone, a high 
incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not 
demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography.”
98
   
ii. Error rates and individualized suspicion 
When probable cause is the requisite standard, courts often assess statistical evidence to 
indicate a likelihood of criminality particular to an individual suspect.  Devices such as drug 
sniffing dogs and fingerprint analysis are used by police to generate suspicion specific to an 
individual.  Instead of using statistics to determine how likely it is that individuals in a group are 
criminals, statistical evidence here quantifies the error rates of investigative tools that indicate 
                                                          
93
 See Bacigal, supra note 19, at 311–14. 
94
 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
95
 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (distinguishing Prouse). 
96
 Id. at 454–55 (The Court also relied on data from other states that “on the whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in 
drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists stopped”).  Id. at 455. 
97
 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).  
98
 United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6tth Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).  As another example, 
courts have held that merely finding drugs in a defendant’s car does not lead to probable cause that he has drugs in 




whether a particular individual is behaving criminally.  The quantification of error rates for such 
devices, therefore, does not ascribe guilt to any class of individuals or otherwise violate the 
notion that probable cause must be based on individualized suspicion. 
For example, quantitative data has been used to assess the reliability of tipsters in providing 
the police with accurate information about criminal activity, based on how many tips lead to the 
discovery of criminal activity.
99
  In fact, some courts have held that “[w]hen an informant has a 
proven track record for providing reliable information, corroboration of the information he 
provides is not necessarily essential . . . .”
100
  However, courts have not quantified in a 
standardized way what constitutes a reliable track record.
101
 
Statistical data is also used to bolster the demonstration of probable cause in cases where a 
binary search leads to a full search.
102
  This is a particularly salient issue in the context of drug 
sniffing dogs, who are constitutionally permitted to sniff the outside of an individual’s vehicle or 
suitcase in a public place without any suspicion.
103
  Courts must then determine if a drug sniffing 
dog’s positive alert provided the police with probable cause to search an area.  As one scholar 
has noted, the Supreme Court has “not yet addressed the specific qualifications that a ‘trained 
canine’ possesses [or] questioned the accuracy record of a particular canine in practice.  As a 




                                                          
99
 See, e.g., United States v. Shepard, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983) (“On approximately thirty earlier occasions 
the informant had provided information that had led to over twenty-five convictions.”).  
100
 United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). 
101
 See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The bar for establishing an informant’s veracity 
through references to his track record is not high. For example, courts have uniformly held that 
an informant's veracity is adequately established when the affiant asserts that the informant has supplied information 
leading to arrests and convictions.”).  
102
 See supra Part I.A. 
103
 See supra Part I.A. 
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In a decision that is being reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court held 
that “field performance records” and evidence regarding the dog handler’s training must be 
considered when a judge assesses whether a dog’s positive alert provided probable cause.
105
  
Many courts across the country have also examined a drug sniffing dog’s “accuracy rate”
 106
 in 
determining whether the dog’s positive alert satisfied the probable cause standard.
 107
  However, 
some courts have held that accuracy rates are not essential to the probable cause 
determination.
108
  Police in those jurisdictions may simply demonstrate that the dog that made 
the positive alert is well trained and certified,
109
 and sometimes do not even need to show that.
110
   
Regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately decides Harris,
111
 courts are increasingly 
recognizing the need to weigh quantifiable evidence relevant to individualized suspicion when 
                                                          
105
 Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (2011). 
106
 Accuracy rates are usually measured by dividing the number of times drugs were found after a particular dog 
alerted to their presence by the number of times that dog alerted to the presence of drugs.  For a full analysis on how 
error rates should be measured and the issues that arise when compiling statistics in the context of drug sniffing 
dogs, see infra Part II.B. 
107
 See United States v. Anderson, 367 Fed. App. 30 (11th Cir. 2010), at *33 (holding that a canine alert was 
sufficient to establish probable cause where, “[e]ven assuming [defendant]'s view of the statistics, Aron [the dog] 
had a 55% accuracy rate in finding measurable amounts of drugs”); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 
(10th Cir. 1997)  (holding that “a 70-80% success rate [by the drug detection dog Bobo] meets the liberal standard 
for probable cause established in Gates”); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The 
affidavit states that Pogo is certified, was trained to alert to drug odors . . . , and had alerted approximately 65 times 
to controlled substances and contraband in four-and-one-half years on the job. Drugs were not found five of those 
times -- for an overall reliability rate of 92 percent.”); United States v. Huerta, 247 F. Supp. 2d 902 (W.D. Ohio 
2002) (“unwilling to conclude that [the dog] Abby’s alert on the van, alone, established probable cause to search 
that vehicle” when Abby had an approximately 65% success rate); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 
773, 776 (App. Ct. Mass. 2008) (holding that probable cause was not satisfied where, in the past six months, dog 
had only five to six correct alerts and two false alerts). 
108
 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of training and certification 
was sufficient but evidence of dog’s performance was admissible on the issue of “credibility” of dog); United States 
v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1005, 1007 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that an affidavit describing Chane as a “trained, 
certified marijuana sniffing dog” was sufficient to give police probable cause to obtain a warrant to search 
“defendant’s locker in the Poco Storage Company”). 
109
 Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment 
to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 761 (2007) (“Often, courts are willing to accept assertions of the dog's 
training and certification as prima facie evidence of a dog's accuracy.”)  See also id. n.96 (citing United States v. 
Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996), Venema, 563 F.2d at 1007, and United States v. Stanley, 4 F. App'x 148, 
150 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
110
 See United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “[t]he fact that the dog alerted 
provided probable cause to search’ even in the absence of a showing of training and reliability”). 
111




conducting a probable cause inquiry.  The Supreme Court’s resistance to quantifying probable 
cause, however, has resulted in assessments of probabilistic evidence that are nonuniform and 
haphazard.  Questions concerning which evidence should be quantified, how to best quantify that 
evidence, and how to interpret the statistics, remain largely unresolved.  Resolution of these 
questions is essential to bringing uniformity to the probable cause inquiry and protecting against 
unreasonable searches. 
II. QUANTIFYING EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO PROBABLE CAUSE 
 
The vices of a vague probable cause standard, including the lack of clarity and susceptibility 
to abuse mentioned above, are not outweighed by its virtues when law enforcement replaces 
investigative techniques that harness a police officer’s expertise or judgment with nonhuman 
tools or forensic methods.
112
  Despite their perceived precision, investigative techniques that rely 
on forensic analysis or mechanized devices are fallible.
113
  Indeed, techniques such as drug 
sniffing dogs, fingerprint analysis,
114
 facial recognition technology,
115
 familial DNA matching,
116
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rates in fingerprint matching “may not be trivial”). 
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 The New York Police Department has invested in facial recognition technology that would, according to one 
court, “use thousands of government and private cameras to capture vehicle license plates, suspicious behavior and 
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and child pornography detecting software have variable rates of error, depending on the quality 
of the tool being used and/or the skill of its human operator.
117
  There is a growing literature on 
the unreliability of positive alerts by drug sniffing dogs due to handlers misreading the dog’s 
signals or influencing the dog’s behavior.
118
   
Despite the potential for false positives, courts have held that positive results from some of 
these techniques, including drug sniffing dogs, can satisfy probable cause without any other basis 
for suspicion.
119
   Other scholars believe that positive results from certain techniques should 
never be enough on their own to satisfy probable cause.
120
  Rather than presume that certain 
types of investigative devices are always reliable enough or never reliable enough to satisfy 
probable cause, courts should hold that alerts from these devices may or may not be sufficient to 
yield probable cause.  Consideration of the error rates of certain investigative tools should be 
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whether any security threat was imminent or whether there was any suspicious pattern in the movement of persons 
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individual examiner, those that are features or products of the work environment, and those that are the result of 
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Anita M. Oberbauer, Handler beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, ANIM. COGN. (2010) (empirically 
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available at http://www.npca.net/Files/SWGDOG/LIT%20Study.pd.  A lawsuit was recently filed alleging that the 
Nevada Highway Patrol was training its dogs to respond to cues instead of the smell of drugs.  See Nicole Benson, 
NHP Troopers Sue Department Over K-9 Program, KLASTV Online, at 
http://www.8newsnow.com/story/18886948/nhp-troopers-sue-department-over-k-9-program. 
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cause.  See infra note X and accompanying text. 
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deemed necessary to determine whether positive alerts by such tools are reliable enough to 
satisfy probable cause to conduct a full search.
121
   
Other investigative techniques, usually those relying on a police officer’s skill or experience, 
would not benefit as much from a rigorous quantification of error rates.  Separating these two 
types of techniques is critical because data collection requires resources, and because an overly 
technical assessment of probable cause may distort the role that police expertise and intuition 
plays in the inquiry.
122
  It is also critical that error rates are measured in ways that can be most 
easily translated into the probable cause inquiry, and that judges are aware of the limitations of 
quantification.   
 
A. Requiring Error Rates 
Rather than presume that positive results from mechanized or nonhuman investigative 
techniques are always (or never) sufficient to satisfy probable cause, quantified error rates should 
be included in the probable cause inquiry.  This section proposes some guidelines for courts to 
determine when to require quantified error rates and when a rigorous assessment of error rates is 
unnecessary. 
i. Cases where quantified error rates are not necessary 
As one scholar has remarked, “[a]ll proof is ultimately ‘probabilistic’ in the sense that no 
conclusion can ever be drawn from empirical data without some step of inductive inference.  The 
question is whether to bring this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a 
                                                          
121
 Some of these techniques are intrusive enough to already be considered searches, requiring probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion before they can be used.  Binary searches may even trigger Fourth Amendment protections if 
they intrude upon privacy interests.  See Simmons, supra note 13, at 459–62. 
122
 See Infra Part III for arguments against quantifying probable cause generally. 
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quantified way, i.e., in overtly probabilistic evidence.”
123
  Some of the evidence relevant to 
probable cause can best be assessed without overtly probabilistic attention, using testimony that 
need not be reduced to numbers.  For example, a police officer’s testimony that a driver had a 
large air freshener hanging from his rearview mirror satisfied probable cause to stop the car for 
violating a statute prohibiting mirror obstructions.
124
  Probable cause was also satisfied when a 
police officer searched a duffel bag belonging to a man arrested for burglary after the police 
officer recognized the bag from the bank robbery.
125
   
Statistical evidence could have been used in these cases, as in every case, to assess the 
reliability of a police officer’s suspicion.  Courts could require data on how often a police officer 
actually recovers evidence from her searches or, in the case of arrests, how often an individual 
targeted has actually committed the crime suspected by police.  However, in situations where the 
police can testify to their direct observations, statistical evidence is not necessary to assess 
reliability.  In these cases, statistical evidence measures only how effectively and how 
scrupulously officers are performing their jobs, and police officers can testify directly.   
For example, the collection of data on a particular informant’s accuracy rate (or “track 
record”) in leading the police to criminal activity can assist the courts in determining if a 
particular informant is likely to be lying or misinformed in a particular case.  However, 
discerning the accuracy of an informant is something law enforcement is trained to do.  In some 
situations, a police officer may have reason to believe that an informant who has been unreliable 
in the past is now highly credible.  A police officer’s expert intuition might actually be more 
accurate in that case than any past statistical evidence of the informant’s track record.
126
  In the 
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 Bacigal, supra note 19, at 295. 
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 See United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612–14 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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 United States v. Potts, No. 11-10423, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2200, at *3–4 (Feb. 3, 2012). 
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 For more on how courts have used informants’ track records, see supra Part I.C. 
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case of informants, police can perform the same task as statistical evidence in determining 
reliability, and in fact can sometimes perform the task better.  Thus, while data on an informant’s 
track record is relevant to probable cause, it should not be required  
As another example, one scholar has proposed that success rates in recovering evidence be 
reported for individual police officers (not just for their informants) as part of the probable cause 
determination.
127
  This data would be helpful in ferreting out officers who lie to obtain warrants 
or who frequently misjudge informants, but should not be deemed necessary to the probable 
cause analysis.  If officers seeking to establish probable cause had to present evidence of their 
own track records, this might overdeter them from following their instincts in close cases for fear 
of being accused of malfeasance.  Moreover, in cases where police are making judgment calls in 
unique or fast-developing situations, the factors influencing probable cause are less susceptible 
to statistical quantification.
128
    
ii. Cases where quantified error rates are necessary 
In contrast, where a police officer uses a device or investigative technique to perform a task 
that she cannot perform based on her observation, intuition, or judgment, statistical evidence 
would not measure how well the police are performing their jobs or whether they are lying to 
magistrate judges, but would evaluate the accuracy of a device is that has essentially replaced the 
police officer.  In addition, because the tools being measured largely do not rely on a police 
officer’s expertise in appraising criminal behavior, and operate somewhat independently of the 
police officer, the officer cannot accurately assess that tool’s reliability based on observation or 
skill.  Error rates should be required, for instance, where the police use drug sniffing dogs 
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outside vehicles at routine traffic stops because the police cannot tell from direct observation in 
that one instance the accuracy of a particular dog.
129
  
Consider a case where a police officer has a witness statement that a particular gun was 
discarded behind a dumpster after being involved in a murder.  Police recover the gun, and a 
fingerprint analyst finds that a latent print left on the gun matches a suspect’s fingerprint.  The 
police officer’s and witness’s testimony (with cross-examination if a court is later reviewing 
probable cause at a criminal trial), speaks directly to whether the gun was actually involved in 
the murder.  No statistics are needed to establish the police officer’s reliability.  Statistical 
evidence on the print examiner’s accuracy rate, however, is needed to assess whether his 
determination that the prints matched was reliable.  The same would be true for DNA matches, 
and positive alerts by drug sniffing dogs and facial recognition technology. 
A more difficult case involves a police officer’s testimony that a suspect was located in a 
“high crime area.”
130
  As mentioned above, presence in a high crime area cannot establish 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion on its own, but may be relevant to the inquiry.
131
  
Suspicion based on presence in a “high crime area” exists on the border between evidence whose 
reliability can be established with direct testimony and evidence that requires statistical 
verification.  Unlike the case of an informant, where a police officer can provide testimony on 
why he trusted a particular informant in a particular situation, it is far more difficult for courts to 
assess whether, in general, an area has certain crime characteristics.  Courts might consider, as 
some scholars have proposed, requiring statistical evidence to demonstrate that a particular 
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location is a high crime area.
132
 However, because police officers are trained to know which 
neighborhoods have particular profiles for criminality, police officers’ testimony about a 
neighborhood being a high crime area is more well-informed and instinctively-based that 
testimony that a particular investigative device is accurate.  Because evidence that an area is high 
in criminal activity cannot on its own satisfy probable cause, courts could simply decide that 
rigorous statistical evidence is less important in this context. 
 
B. Calculating Error Rates    
Once a court determines that a particular investigative technique requires statistical evidence 
to assess its reliability, this data must be properly calculated.  False positive rates, which measure 
how often a device positively alerts given an innocent situation, can assess a device’s consistent, 
unchanging reliability.
133
  However, false positive rates are not directly translatable into the 
probable cause inquiry because they do not account for how often a device actually detects true 
criminal activity.  This number will vary based on the population that is targeted by an 
investigative device.  The question most appropriate to the probable cause inquiry is: what 
percentage of positive alerts by a particular investigative device actually lead to the discovery of 
criminal behavior?  
As explained in this subsection, in order to best assist a judge in making a probable cause 
determination, statistical evidence must account for both a device’s accuracy and the odds of 
criminality prior to using the device.  These prior odds of criminality represent both the 
frequency of criminal activity among those targeted for the device’s use (often referred to as 
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 and any extra suspicion a particular suspect has elicited prior to use of the device.  
A positive alert and a device’s false positive rate then “updates”
135
 these prior odds of 
criminality.  The prior odds and the consistent device accuracy combine to answer the probable 
cause question—or, the odds that criminal behavior is occurring.    
i. False positive rates 
To ensure that a device is accurate enough to be relevant to the probable cause inquiry, courts 
first need to know how an investigative tool’s positive alert affects the prior likelihood that a 
suspect is behaving criminally.
136
  A device with a high error rate provides information that is 
not particularly relevant to the probable cause inquiry, and does not greatly influence the prior 
likelihood of criminality.  If a device is infallible, then every time it indicates criminal activity, 
courts can be sure there is a 100% chance that criminal activity is occurring.  In measuring the 
accuracy of a fallible device, courts should be concerned with “false positives,” or incorrect 
indications of criminal behavior.
137
  False positives are particularly troubling in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment, as they lead to intrusive searches of innocent individuals.
138
   
False positive rates can be measured by testing a device in simulated situations where the 
device should not positively alert.  For example, if facial recognition technology is exposed to 
100 faces that do not actually match a suspect’s face, and the technology indicates a match for 50 
of those faces, the technology has a 50% false positive rate.  That device’s accuracy is no better 
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than flipping a coin, and thus adds no information to the probable cause inquiry.  If Bandit the 
cocaine sniffing dog, in a training test, is exposed to 1000 cars that do not contain cocaine, and 
Bandit alerts to the presence of drugs in two of those cars, Bandit has a fairly low false positive 
rate of 0.2 percent.  Bandit’s accuracy means that his positive alert is highly relevant to 
determining the likelihood that a car contains cocaine.   
False positive rates do not give a complete picture of probable cause, however.  Even if a 
device has a very low rate of false positives, this does not always translate to a high likelihood of 
criminal activity, the essence of the probable cause inquiry.
139
  In other words, Bandit’s 0.2% 
false positive rate does not necessarily mean that there is now a 99.8% chance that a car that 
Bandit alerts to contains cocaine.  If there is a low incidence of cocaine in vehicles targeted by 
Bandit, say one out of every 10,000 vehicles, Bandit’s 0.2% false positive rate will not translate 
to a high likelihood of drugs in a vehicle given a positive alert.  For every 10,000 vehicles, 
Bandit will falsely alert to the presence of cocaine 20 times (10,000 x .002), and he will correctly 
alert to the presence of drugs once.  Thus, given a positive alert by Bandit, there will be only a 
1/21 chance, or about a 5 percent chance, that a particular vehicle alerted to by Bandit will 
contain drugs.  This should not satisfy probable cause – a 5 percent likelihood of criminal 
activity can hardly be said to warrant a person of “reasonable caution in the belief that an offense 
has been or is being committed.”
140
  In short, Bandit’s false positive rate means that his positive 
alert is very relevant to the probable cause inquiry, and it highly alters the prior probability of 
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criminality of 1/10,000.  However, the low percentage of drugs in the population targeted by 
Bandit means that his positive alert likely does not cross the probable cause hurdle.
141
   
This example illustrates why statistical evidence that accounts solely for false positive rates 
does not actually measure the odds of criminal behavior.
142
  Professor Richard Myers has 
explained, in the context of drug sniffing dogs and probability theory, why the odds that a dog 
will alert given that there are no drugs in a vehicle (the false positive rate), is not the same as the 
odds that there are no drugs in a vehicle given that a dog has alerted (the information needed to 
answer the probable cause question).
143
  Using an equation called Bayes’ Theorem, Myers 
explains that what is missing from the false positive rate to convert it into the odds of criminal 
behavior is the prior probability of criminal activity.
144
  This prior probability can reflect either 
the degree to which an officer already suspects an individual,
145
 or the frequency of the criminal 
behavior within a population targeted by a device.
146
  As with the Bandit example, the false 
positive rate of a device is said to update the original odds of criminality with new odds for a 
particular suspect who has been identified as engaging in criminal behavior by the device.
147
   
ii. Accuracy rates 
To properly measure the actual likelihood of criminal behavior based on a positive alert by 
an investigative tool, statistical evidence must therefore account for both the tool’s accuracy (the 
false positive rate) and either the frequency of criminality of those targeted for a device’s use, or 
some measure of a police officer’s suspicion prior to the positive alert (the prior odds of 
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  The frequency of criminal behavior in a population is difficult to measure, and it 
is basically impossible to quantify many of the intangible factors tending towards suspicion. 
Because even a low false positive rate is not a good indicator of likelihood of criminal activity, 
especially with largely innocent populations or where the police have no other reason to suspect 
someone of wrongdoing,
149
 Professor Myers argues that a positive alert by a drug sniffing dog 
should never be sufficient on its own to satisfy probable cause.
150
     
However, there is a way to collect data that accounts for both a tool’s accuracy and the prior 
odds of criminality within the population targeted for use by a device.  Police officers could 
record statistics in the field instead of measuring false positives in simulations.  Field statistics 
measure how often a device’s positive alert leads to finding criminal activity, the key number for 
the probable cause analysis.  Many courts already use field statistics in the context of drug 
sniffing dogs,
151
 although law enforcement does not always appear to be calculating them 
correctly.
152
  To translate most directly into the probable cause inquiry, courts must assess the 
number of times drugs were found in the car out of the times that the dog has positively alerted, 
not given all the times a dog has been used.  
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As an example, if Lucy the drug sniffing dog positively alerts to the presence of drugs in 100 
cars targeted for drug sniffs in New York City, and 90 of those cars actually contain drugs, Lucy 
has a 90% field accuracy rate.  If those field statistics can be extrapolated generally, which is a 
difficult question that will be discussed in the next subsection,
153
 courts can then conclude that if 
Lucy alerts to the presence of drugs in a vehicle, there is a 90% chance that drugs will be found 
in that vehicle.  This answers the probable cause question, and a 90% likelihood of criminality 
will certainly satisfy probable cause.  Ten out of 100 cars searches will likely not contain drugs, 
but probable cause does not require that no innocents are searched.  In contrast with a 50% false 
positive rate, if Lucy positively alerts to the presence of drugs 100 times, and 50 of those cars 
actually contain drugs, we would say that Lucy has a 50% field accuracy rate, which is far better 
than chance.  We might then also be able to say say that there is a 50% chance that drugs are 
actually in the vehicle if Lucy alerts.  Depending on the actual probable cause hurdle, probable 
cause may or may not be satisfied in that case.   
For many cases, field statistics can directly translate into the probable cause inquiry.  Field 
statistics reflect the degree of suspicion associated with a suspect’s behavior and the likelihood 
of criminality prior to using a device because, if officers target only those who seem suspicious, 
and those whose seem suspicious are more likely to be behaving criminally, field accuracy rates 
will increase dramatically.
154
  Of course, police officers will then be using their intuitive 
judgment to determine which suspects to target, but that intuition is then entirely reflected in an 
increase or decrease in the device’s accuracy.  The device thus both reflects and replaces the 
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officer’s intuition.  In the Lucy example, any prior suspicion a police officer has before using 
Lucy is essentially transferred into her nose in altering her accuracy rate.  Moreover, once the 
device has essentially replaced the police officer’s intuition, only statistical evidence can attest to 
the device’s reliability.  Ultimately, it is the positive alert by the device, and not the police 
officer, that makes a prediction relevant to probable cause.   
Field statistics even account for human error in using a device, as decreased accuracy rates in 
the field will result if law enforcement is using a device incorrectly.  In the case of drug sniffing 
dogs, a dog’s handler may unconsciously cue the dog to alert when the handler thinks a vehicle is 
likely to contain drugs.
155
  This interaction between dog and handler will be incorporated into the 
field accuracy rates.  If an officer is incorrect most of the time, the accuracy rate will decrease.  If 
the interaction between dog and handler makes it more likely that a positive alert will lead to the 
discovery of drugs, this will also be reflected in the accuracy rate.   
Field statistics thus incorporate the prior odds of criminal wrongdoing and the accuracy of an 
investigative tool, which translate to the likelihood of criminal activity.  Taking field statistics 
has some costs, however, and it may be difficult to discern which field statistics can be 
extrapolated so as to be relevant to a particular probable cause inquiry.  These issues will be 
addressed in the next subpart.   
 
C. Problems with Quantifying Error Rates 
The most obvious difficulty in mandating that quantified error rates be included as part of the 
probable cause inquiry is the time and cost of collecting this data.  Although federal, state, and 
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local legislatures routinely require that law enforcement collect certain statistics,
156
 the collection 
of data on accuracy rates relevant to the probable cause inquiry would, necessarily, be an 
unfunded mandate – courts can require the collection of such statistics, but cannot allocate 
money to fund the effort.  However, many law enforcement groups already collect statistics 
testing the accuracy of particular investigative devices in order to more effectively perform their 
jobs.
157
  In many ways, the collection of this data would redound to the benefit of the law 
enforcement community: skeptical judges can be satisfied when devices are accurate, and law 
enforcement can have more faith in its investigations.  Requiring statistical evidence on a 
device’s accuracy rate may deter police officers from using devices in a random, haphazard 
ways, which would otherwise result in more false alerts in largely innocent populations.
158
     
Of course, asking law enforcement, or forensic scientists,
159
 to collect statistical evidence on 
the accuracy of its investigative tools could be likened to letting the fox guard the henhouse.  
Random checks and supervisory oversight can prevent police officers from improperly reporting 
statistics, but unscrupulous police officers may fail to report searches that do not result in 
uncovering evidence of illegal activity.  That said, police officers are asked to collect statistics in 
areas that impugn their integrity far more than recording the accuracy of their investigative 
devices.
160
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Even if police scrupulously record statistics, whether a device has actually produced a false 
alert may be a complicated question.  For example, law enforcement officers may argue that if a 
drug sniffing dog gives a positive alert, but no drugs are found, then the area recently contained 
drugs that were removed prior to the search.
161
  For the purposes of the probable cause inquiry, 
the best approach would be to assume an inaccurate alert in all cases where illegal activity is not 
ultimately found.  Because there is usually no way to tell whether drugs have been removed or if 
they were never there in the first place, assuming that the dog has alerted falsely best measures 
the percentage of cases in which a positive alert actually leads to the detection of criminal 
behavior, the essence of the probable cause inquiry.  The point of collecting accuracy rates is 
ultimately not to test the quality of the dog, but the meaning of an alert by the dog—an alert that 
means “there used to be cocaine here” isn’t enough for a search. 
Problems will also arise in deciding which field accuracy data should be considered in the 
probable cause determination.  Courts must consider whether all field data collected with respect 
to a particular dog is relevant, or only field data that is specific to a dog/law enforcement handler 
pair.  Field sobriety tests, as another example, show a wide variance in accuracy depending on 
the officer administering the test.
162
  Thus, data should be recorded for each officer individually.   
Because the baseline frequency of criminal behavior in a population and odds with respect to 
a particular suspect based on her behavior contributes to the field accuracy rates, courts must 
decide whether data from different areas in the same city can be combined, and whether data 
from the use of a someone who behaved suspiciously can be combined with data for a 
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suspicionless use of the device.
163
  If the police always use a device when there is some reason to 
suspect an individual of criminal behavior, this will compensate for any differences in the 
frequency of criminality in different locations and produce a consistent accuracy rate.  In that 
instance, data from different locations in the same city can be combined and extrapolated into the 
probable cause inquiry.  
Questions regarding the basis for accuracy rates may mire courts in battles over whether the 
statistical evidence offered can be directly translated into the probable cause inquiry.  However, 
this has not been overly problematic for the jurisdictions that already include statistical evidence 
in the probable cause inquiry.
164
  Currently, as mentioned above, courts already use field 
accuracy statistics and extrapolate to the probable cause inquiry in the areas of informants’ track 
records, efficacy of checkpoints, and high crime areas; they are just not doing so in a particularly 
informed or systematized way.
165
     
The concern over which evidence is relevant to the probable cause inquiry can be resolved by 
simply giving more specific evidence more weight.  Professor Max Minzner proposed a similar 
solution in the context of arguing that police should be required to present their accuracy rates as 
part of the probable cause inquiry.
166
  According to Minzner, the way in which the evidence was 
gathered, and how specific it is, should influence how much weight the evidence merits in the 
probable cause inquiry.
167
  For example, if evidence is collected pertaining to the field accuracy 
rate of a particular drug sniffing dog/handler pair in a specific area in Philadelphia, and the dog is 
generally used only when police suspect an individual for other reasons insufficient to satisfy 
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probable cause on their own, that data is highly relevant to the likelihood that an individual in 
that neighborhood, when targeted based on the usual level of suspicion by that particular 
dog/handler pair, is carrying drugs.   
In other words, statistical evidence collected in a very specific way is highly extrapolatable to 
a particular instance that matches the other field data.   In contrast, evidence that is supported 
only by more general evidence carries less weight and may not be directly extrapolated into the 
probable cause likelihood, but can still be considered.  If an accuracy rate is not measured 
specifically enough, for example, a court could hold that the prosecution has not met its burden 
of proof to satisfy probable cause.  Or, a court could conclude that, in showing that a particular 
dog has a 70% accuracy rate with less specific statistical evidence, that the evidence is sufficient 
to meet the 50% hurdle.   
Those who argue against overly quantified legal standards also present the “capacity 
objection,” which asserts that courts, not generally experts in mathematics, are not well equipped 
to assess statistical evidence.
168
   The capacity objection provides another reason why courts 
should require statistical evidence only when there is no other valid way to assess whether a 
positive alert by that device gave rise to probable cause.  However, this objection has much more 
salience when juries, not judges, are examining probabilistic evidence.
169
  According to 
Minzner,
170
 “magistrate judges . . . are repeat players in the search process.  If statistical learning 
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is possible, the search process presents the ideal test case.  Furthermore, there is little evidence 
that judges are better at making a probability calculation from nonstatistical evidence.”
171
   
Judges, repeat players, can be instructed as to the pitfalls of weighing probabilistic evidence.  
The evolution of the increasingly nuanced and scientifically accurate role that DNA evidence in 
criminal trials demonstrates how this learning occurs.
172
  Although Daubert-type hearings, which 
ensure that scientific evidence satisfies the requirements for expert testimony in the civil context, 
would not be necessary at the probable cause stage,
173
 the role of judge as gatekeeper to admit 
only scientifically valid testimony at trial should allay fears about a judge’s ability to conduct a 
flexible inquiry that examines error rates and is probabilistic in nature.
174
 
In some cases, courts may decide they must use false positive data instead of field accuracy 
rates.  Using data on false positives is an attractive option because false positive rates are more 
easily measured and do not change based on the frequency of criminality within a population.  
New devices or recently developed techniques may require consideration of false positives, as 
there will be insufficient field statistics to measure accuracy.  Alternatively, courts could use 
statistics from other devices; they could presume, for instance, that a well-trained dog is 
generally a certain percentage accurate until the dog has a large enough number of alerts.    
False positive data, generated by simulations, would also have to substitute for field data in 
cases where police cannot ultimately verify whether a suspect was behaving criminally.  This 
                                                          
171
 Minzner, supra note 75, at 954-55. 
172
 See generally David H. Kaye, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, Harvard University 
Press (2010). 
173 As one federal circuit court remarked with respect to dog sniffs, “the dog’s alert . . . would serve not as actual 
evidence of drugs, but simply to establish probable cause to obtain a warrant to search for such substantive 
evidence.”  United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 839-40 (4th Cir. 1998). 
174
 The Supreme Court in Daubert listed several factors for judges to consider before admitting expert testimony 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  The Court instructed judges that, “in the case of a particular scientific 
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 
594 (1993) (citation omitted). 
43 
 
occurs in cases of fingerprint or DNA analysis, where a match may be found by a forensic 
scientist but there is no way to ultimately know if the suspect is guilty.  Testing can still be 
performed on individual fingerprint examiners using artificial experiments to measure an 
examiner’s false positive rate.
175
  However, as mentioned above, false positive data does not 
speak directly to the probable cause inquiry.
176
 
In cases where statistics truly cannot be collected, because of extreme hardship or cost or 
complexity of data collection, courts could mandate standardized training in using a device.
177
  
One of the reasons that the Florida Supreme Court required field evidence of drug sniffing dogs’ 
accuracy as part of the probable cause inquiry was because “[i]n the absence of a uniform 
standard [of training of drug sniffing dogs], the reliability of the dog cannot be established by 
demonstrating only that a canine is trained and certified.”
178
  Standardized training and uniform 
protocols have also been suggested for fingerprint examiners.
179
 
Civil liberties are compromised when law enforcement uses fallible devices that sanction 
intrusive searches with no indication of their reliability.  Ultimately, it is better to quantify 
accuracy rates than simply presume that a particular device’s positive alert gives rise to probable 
cause when it may not.  Especially with new technology on the horizon,
180
 courts should 
establish standards for measuring an investigative tool’s reliability.   
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III. Quantifiable Evidence and The Probable Cause Standard 
 
As mentioned earlier, some courts have already begun mandating admission of quantifiable 
error rates for specific investigative techniques, like drug sniffing dogs.  Even if most courts do 
not follow suit, prosecutors or defense counsel often choose to admit this type of evidence.  
Courts are already confronting probabilistic evidence in many forms.  When evidence sufficient 
to satisfy probable cause is admitted in probabilistic terms, the reasons for not assigning a 
minimum probability of certainty necessary to satisfy probable cause are far less compelling.   
There have not been many proposals to quantify probable cause.  According to Professor 
Craig Lerner, “[f]ew courts have summoned the courage, or foolhardiness, to propose . . . a 
number (e.g., thirty percent probability) for probable cause.”
181
   Lerner instead offered a 
mathematical formula to evaluate probable cause that balances the probability of a successful 
search and its social value against a search’s social cost, or privacy intrusion.
182
  Another scholar, 
Ronald Bacigal, came closer to quantifying probable cause, by assigning probable cause a range 
of approximately 40%-49%,
183
 but stopped short of “endorsing precise mathematical expressions 
of probable cause.”
 184
  Bacigal, wishing to add some clarity to the probable cause inquiry, still 
cautions that “[t]oo much precision diminishes the resources of ambiguity.”
185
    
There are situations, however, where the utility of ambiguity is outweighed by the benefits of 
clarifying the standard, especially in light of recent developments that have greatly diminished 
review of probable cause decisions.
186
  Quantifying probable cause would add both integrity and 
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accountability to the jurisprudence, allowing citizens to evaluate courts’ decisions and reducing 
cynicism over application of the fuzzy, “malleable probable cause standard.”
187
  Quantifying 
probable cause can also provide police with a more certain standard to guide their decisions in 
the field.   
This final section examines how assigning a minimum numerical value to the probable cause 
hurdle would function in a variety of scenarios, and explores how courts should chose the 
numerical value.  In so doing, this section rebuts the myriad objections by courts and scholars to 
quantifying probable cause. 
 
A. Quantifying Probable Cause  
Quantifying probable cause presents varying benefits and drawbacks, depending on the 
types of evidence used to satisfy probable cause.  There are three basic scenarios in which judges 
would confront a numerical probable cause standard.  In cases where a positive alert from a 
mechanized device is the critical factor in producing probable cause, many of the objections to 
assigning probable cause a value disappear.  The quantifiable evidence can be used directly to 
determine whether the probable cause standard is satisfied.  In cases where both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence are necessary to satisfy probable cause, judges cannot simply rely on the 
quantifiable evidence and compare it to the probable cause number.  However, judges can use 
the value associated with probable cause to discern how close the quantifiable evidence comes to 
satisfying probable cause and can then assess whether the qualitative evidence, combined with 
the quantitative evidence, crosses the probable cause threshold.  In cases where only qualitative 
                                                          
187
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evidence is considered, assigning probable cause a numerical percentage is valuable only to the 
extent that it provides a conceptual benchmark, but judges should not attempt to actually 
quantify the inquiry.    
i. Cases where quantifiable evidence is the critical factor in satisfying probable cause 
In situations where quantifiable evidence is the sole or critical factor creating probable cause, 
the benefits of added clarity in the law outweigh the downsides of quantifying probable cause.  
Consider a common scenario.  The police pull over a vehicle and briefly detain an individual for 
reasons unrelated to drug possession, such as making an improper lane change,
188
 or having an 
improperly illuminated license plate.
189
  While detained, the individual behaves suspiciously, 
perhaps appearing nervous when answering questions,
190
 but the behavior is not sufficiently 
suspicious to give the police probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of illegal 
activity.
191
  However, the suspicion suffices to permit the police to continue detaining the 
individual to wait for a drug sniffing dog to arrive and sniff the exterior of the vehicle.
192
  The 
dog positively alerts to the presence of drugs inside the vehicle, giving the police probable cause 
to search the vehicle, and drugs are ultimately found.
193
  A court upholds the search, largely 
based on the probable cause created by the dog’s alert.
194
  The court will cite language such as 
“[a] positive identification by a dog during a canine search following a lawful stop of a vehicle 
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In this scenario, the sniff is the critical factor in satisfying probable cause.  The police would 
likely concede that probable cause did not exist prior to the positive alert, and a court would 
likely justify the search almost exclusively based on that positive alert.  Now let’s assume that 
this dog’s field accuracy rate with a particular handler, when calculated correctly, is 50%.
196
  
This court’s probable cause assessment would be greatly assisted if the court knew that probable 
cause requires a 35% likelihood, or a 40% likelihood, a 50%, or a 51% likelihood, of criminal 
activity.   
Accepting the field accuracy rate as reliable evidence of the likelihood that drugs are in the 
vehicle, the court can compare the field accuracy rate to the assigned probable cause standard to 
determine if probable cause is met solely based on the positive alert.  Courts make this 
comparison already.
197
  Courts holding that the accuracy rates of certain devices are sufficient to 
satisfy probable cause must have some minimum threshold in their minds, but that number is not 
uniform and is usually not transparent to the citizenry, the police, or other courts.  As one court 
held in the context of drug sniffing dogs, “[b]ased on historical performance, this dog’s alert 
suggested a 58% chance of finding a seizable quantity of drugs.  While we hesitate to get into the 
business of affixing figures on probable cause, if we were pushed to do so we would hold this to 
be enough.” 
198
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This example demonstrates a situation where many of the objections to quantifying the 
probable cause standard are overblown.  When the evidence in favor of suspicion is already 
quantified in a form that directly translates into the probable cause question,
199
 it seems silly to 
doggedly contend that probable cause is incapable of quantification.  Although some scholars 
have argued that “using math to enlighten discussions of probable cause”
200
 gives the illusion of 
precision, the sense of precision gleaned from quantifying probable cause is no longer false when 
field accuracy rates are collected and calculated correctly.   Further, the concern that assigning a 
minimum probable cause probability will cause courts to give undue weight to probabilistic 
evidence over nonscientific or case-specific evidence is greatly diminished in cases where 
probable cause is satisfied based on quantifiable evidence.
201
   
 Moreover, in cases like the one presented above, even if there are other factors besides 
the quantifiable evidence that also create suspicion, these factors can be directly translated into 
the accuracy rate of the device.  The qualitative evidence essentially becomes quantitative.  Thus, 
if field statistics are collected in situations that closely resemble the case at issue,
202
 the court 
should not even factor in other suspicious behavior, like the failure to maintain eye contact with 
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the police.  The field accuracy rate will already reflect the fact that most suspects targeted for the 
drug sniff display some amount of suspicious behavior.
203
    
However, there will be instances where there the statistical evidence is not sufficiently 
numerous or specific to extrapolate the likelihood of criminal behavior from the field accuracy 
rate alone.
204
  In those cases, there is a legitimate concern that assigning probable cause a 
numerical value will cause a judge to nonetheless feel compelled to use the insufficient accuracy 
rate to answer the probable cause inquiry.  A more generalized version of this fear has been 
articled by Professor Orin Kerr, who contends that if probable cause is quantified into a hard 
number, judges will be less likely to heed their logical, yet unexpressed, intuitions and instincts 
about a case.
205
   
Professor Kerr uses an example of a fictional “scientific study by top Harvard scientists 
showing that marijuana can be found in 60% of Harvard dormitory rooms.”
206
  He argues that 
quantifying probable cause may stifle a judge’s intuition that the 60% suspicion created by the 
study, although perhaps a high enough percentage to satisfy probable cause, feels insufficient.  
This instinct is based on the unconscious but logical skepticism as to why additional evidence 
was not collected to rule out or place specific suspicion upon the particular dorm room that 
police seek to search.
207
  Instead of allowing judges to follow their intuitions about information 
not provided to the courts, quantifying probable cause might compel a judge to simply hold that 
a 60% likelihood satisfies probable cause.     
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Professor Kerr, however, does not address situations where individualized, quantifiable 
evidence is incorporated into the probable cause inquiry.  His objection reflects the problems 
inherent in using group statistics instead of individualized suspicion to satisfy probable cause.
 208
   
Indeed, many of the objections to quantifying probable cause provide examples involving group 
probabilities where there is no individualized suspicion.
209
  These examples do not pertain to a 
situation where the quantifiable evidence is sufficiently particularized on its own to answer the 
probable cause inquiry.  
Yet, Professor Kerr’s objections may be valid even in cases where individualized suspicion is 
quantified.  Professor Kerr explains that quantification of probable cause could “provide a fertile 
ground for cognitive biases,”
210
  such as the “representativeness heuristic,” or “the tendency to 
measure probability by reference to data that seems to resemble the probability to be 
estimated.”
211
   A judge may have some intuition, that she cannot express mathematically, that 
the statistical evidence tending toward suspicion has not been properly collected or calculated, 
but she may feel compelled to compare a the 49% field accuracy rate presented to a 45% 
established hurdle and find that probable cause is satisfied.   
A thorough understanding of the issues at play would allow a judge to discount certain field 
accuracy rates as less relevant.  For example, if a dog’s field accuracy rate is 60%, but a judge 
finds that the field accuracy data measured in a way that was not specific enough, she can decide 
that she is confident enough in that data to allow it to satisfy a 40% probable cause hurdle, if 
probable cause is defined that way, but not a 50% probable cause hurdle.  Alternatively, judges 
                                                          
208
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need not accept all field accuracy rates as dispositive of probable cause if there is reason to doubt 
them.  For example, a Massachusetts court of appeals upheld a trial court’s holding that a 
positive alert by the canine detection dog Frisco did not satisfy probable cause because Frisco’s 
training was lacking in some areas, and because he had properly detected drugs only five or six 
times and had improperly alerted to drugs twice.
212
  Defining the probable cause standard would 
likely not have affected this outcome, as there was so little data that the two false positives 
alarmed the judge.   
Moreover, judges are already finding probable cause based on field accuracy rates, often 
without fully assessing whether these accuracy rates can be extrapolated into the probable cause 
inquiry.
213
  A judge may just as easily harbor illogical intuitive views about a case, such as that 
certain investigative devices are infallible and their positive alerts always satisfy probable cause.  
Requiring quantifiable evidence and quantifying probable cause would undermine judges’ 
discretion to import their unfounded assumptions into a standardless probable cause inquiry.  
Quantifying probable cause when the evidence is already in probabilistic form would allow a 
good balance between judicial discretion and judicial transparency/uniformity.  
Of course, in cases where a field accuracy rate obviously exceeds the probable cause hurdle, 
assigning a numerical value to probable cause is less important.  Judges do not need to know that 
a “fair probability”
214
 is 48% in order to determine that probable cause is met by a drug sniffing 
dog with a properly calculated 90% field accuracy rate.  However, the Supreme Court should 
reject the notion that probable cause cannot be defined numerically in anticipation of the 
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marginal cases, which do exist, especially as more technology replaces traditional police work.
215
  
Once the view that probable cause cannot be quantified is rejected, the Supreme Court could 
either allow lower courts to experiment with selecting a number before ultimately assigning one, 
or the Court could simply give guidance on what that number is when it confronts a probable 
cause case where the critical evidence is quantifiable.  
ii.      When quantifiable evidence is presented alongside other factors  
 
When quantifiable evidence must be considered by a court alongside several other significant 
factors, assigning a numerical value to probable cause has a greater chance of distorting the 
probable cause inquiry.  The concern that courts will overvalue probabilistic evidence becomes 
more salient when the probabilistic evidence is insufficient on its own to satisfy probable cause.  
However, assigning probable cause a numerical value would assist judges in understanding the 
significance of the quantifiable evidence and then determining how much more qualitative 
evidence is needed to cross the probable cause hurdle.   
For example, consider a case where facial recognition technology’s accuracy rate is 42%.  
The police had a positive alert by this technology, and the data is reliable, but the police also had 
reason to believe that a particular pedestrian was a wanted bank robber because he appears 
nervous and walks briskly past police officers.  Assuming that a 42% likelihood of criminal 
activity is not sufficient to satisfy probable cause, assigning a numerical value to probable cause 
allows a judge to assess how closely the quantifiable evidence comes to being sufficient.  The 
quantifiable evidence’s contribution to the probable cause inquiry can be resolved, and now it is 
up to the judge’s discretion and prior caselaw to determine if the qualitative factors pointing 
                                                          
215
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towards suspicion cross the probable cause threshold.
216
  Probable cause functions as more of a 
benchmark to guide judges.  If probable cause is set at 60%, a judge will want to see a lot more 
qualitative evidence than if probable cause is set at 45%.   
In cases like these, it is important to note that any extra suspicion, like the suspect’s 
nervousness or brisk walking, may already be reflected in the accuracy rate of the facial 
recognition technology.  Judges must be careful not to double count suspicion, which would 
occur if the statistical evidence collected on the facial recognition device already reflects the fact 
that most suspects targeted for use by the technology also appear nervous.  However, if this 
technology is usually used on random individuals, or whenever a passerby resembles a wanted 
suspect without regard to whether he appears suspicious, then a judge should consider the 
suspect’s nervousness and brisk walking to augment the suspicion calculated by positive alert by 
facial recognition technology.  This type of analysis also applies to drug sniffing dogs and all 
other technology whose accuracy is measured in the field.       
iii. When all of the evidence is qualitative 
When all of the evidence presented is qualitative, or when judges give little weight to the 
quantifiable evidence, courts should not feel compelled to use the percentage assigned to 
probable cause to dispose of the probable cause inquiry.  However, assigning a numerical value 
to probable cause can still assist judges in making probable cause determinations, so long as they 
appreciate that this number serves only as a reference.   
This might occur in a case involving an informant with a track record that is reliable but that 
that does not reflect enough data points to be directly extrapolated into the probable cause 
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inquiry.   If the court determines based on experience, intuition, and prior caselaw that the 
informant’s statements are sufficiently corroborated by the police to satisfy probable cause, the 
court need not trouble itself with the actual quantum of suspicion assigned as a minimum value 
to probable cause.
217
  Prior caselaw would control regardless of the likelihood assigned to 
probable cause.   
Yet, having some conception of the magnitude of the probable cause hurdle can assist judges 
in evaluating whether an informant’s testimony has met the standard.  Without feeling bound by 
the number, or compelled to quantify the inquiry, a judge’s assessment of whether a unique set of 
facts satisfies probable cause may well change depending on whether probable cause is 30% or 
50%. 
Alternatively, in cases where most or all of the evidence is qualitative, and assigning a 
precise number to probable cause is unhelpful, judges could conceptualize probable cause as a 
range, as Professor Bacigal proposes.
218
  This would alleviate some of the confusion surrounding 
probable cause, without fostering many of the cognitive biases that arise when flexible inquiries 
are made overly rigid.  This range could place as its center the number assigned to probable 
cause for cases where quantifiable evidence is the critical factor demonstrating probable cause.  
When quantifiable evidence and unquantified evidence are both essential to the probable 
cause inquiry, or when all of the evidence is qualitative, flexibility in application of the probable 
cause standard is important.  Quantifying probable cause may undermine this flexibility if judges 
ignore their intuitions or convert evidence that is not susceptible to quantification into fictional 
percentages.  Courts must be advised about the pitfalls inherent in quantifying the standard.   
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B. Selecting the Number 
The selection of the number associated with the probable cause hurdle will be a difficult 
endeavor.  The number assigned must reflect the fact that probable cause balances the degree of 
suspicion at which security/law enforcement interests trump privacy interests.
219
  Additionally, 
the numerical threshold must be a percentage that judges can easily abstract and conceptualize in 
their minds.   
Although there is wide variance about what this percentage is, a significant number of courts 
and scholars assume that probable cause is within the 40% to 51% range.
220
  In case assigning 
probable cause a numerical value will dilute its power and mystery, and consequently the privacy 
protections that it affords, probable cause should be placed towards the higher end of this range.  
Many courts have assumed that probable cause does not require a preponderance of the evidence 
in favor of suspicion,
221
 but this standard can be conceptually helpful in selecting a benchmark. 
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in contexts unrelated to probable cause, judges 
frequently apply the preponderance of the evidence standard.
222
  This standard has an 
approximate numerical percentage of just above 50 percent; some describe it as akin to “50% 
and a feather,
”223
 others deem it to be 51 percent.
224
  One solution to assigning probable cause a 
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number that is easy to conceptualize is to select the other side of the preponderance standard, so 
that probable cause is satisfied at just slightly lower than 50%.  For courts, then, a “fair 
probability” would occur where the evidence tending towards suspicion is almost at the point 
where it is in equipoise, but may be slightly less.  Because judges already have a sense of when 
evidence tips slightly above 50%, they can also appreciate when evidence slips slightly below 
50%, or the other side of the preponderance coin.   
Through the stages of review, slightly below 50% would be used as a benchmark.  At the 
lowest level of the inquiry, an “officer of reasonable caution”
225
 must be able to believe that 
evidence of a crime would be found by at least 50% (this is, after all, what it usually means to 
have a belief), but a magistrate judge issuing a warrant or a court examining a warrantless search 
of an automobile would assign as the “fair probability”
226
 a value slightly below 50 percent. 
Alternatively, judges could place some band of error around 50% to determine whether a 
reasonable police officer could have considered the likelihood of criminal behavior to be 50 
percent.
227
  Then, reviewing courts decide if there is a “substantial basis”
228
 for concluding that 
this threshold of slightly below 50%, the inferiority of the evidence, is met.    
A serious consequence of assigning probable cause one particular percentage is that it will 
force courts to apply the same probable cause value regardless of the severity of the crime.  The 
Court currently maintains, according to Professor Bacigal, “the fiction of one uniform definition 
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 An analogue occurs in the context of conditional probabilities, where evidence is probative only if a precondition 
is met.  For example, the fact that a murder victim cheated on the defendant is relevant to prove motive only if the 
defendant was aware of the cheating.  In those cases, a judge will admit evidence of the cheating if a reasonable jury 
could have found that the defendant was aware of this fact by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Federal Rules of 







  However, some Justices and lower courts have insinuated that probable 
cause standard should be a sliding scale, depending on the gravity of the offense.
230
  Justice 
Robert Jackson wrote in a dissenting opinion that,   
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about 
the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating 
use of the search. The officers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any 
particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed 
fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if 
it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not 
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon 




There are important reasons why the probable cause hurdle should not vary depending on the 
severity of the crime uncovered.  A variable probable cause standard might enable courts to use 
hindsight judgment to uphold or invalidate searches, depending on how severe the criminal 
activity ultimately turned out to be.  Having probable cause depend on a balancing the severity of 
the crime against the nature of the intrusion would also convert probable cause into a more 
general “reasonableness” standard, whose malleability is even more susceptible to manipulation 
based on the concerns of the day than the harder line of the probable cause standard.
232
   
There are also arguments for allowing flexibility in the probable cause hurdle depending on 
the nature of the crime, as Justice Jackson’s kidnapping example illustrates.
233
  However, if the 
Court wants to the probable cause standard to vary depending on the situation, it should hold so 
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explicitly, instead of purporting to apply a “single familiar standard.”
234
  The Supreme Court 
should truly grapple with whether the severity of the crime should affect probable cause, instead 




C. Other Solutions 
There are, of course, other solutions to incorporating quantifiable evidence besides assigning 
a minimum percentage of suspicion necessary to satisfy probable cause.  Courts could, for 
instance, assign maximum false positive error rates and conditions of usage in order to allow a 
positive alert to be relevant to the probable cause inquiry.  Or, courts could simply mandate that 
the use of all devices that essentially replace police officers must be preceded by uniform, 
standardized training and testing.  These solutions would enable a more rigorous probable cause 
inquiry to preclude what many courts are currently doing, which is presuming that positive alerts 
by particular devices and investigative techniques are sufficient, even in the absence of data, to 
satisfy probable cause. 
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court decides that courts require the flexibility to alter the 
probable cause standard depending on the severity or exigency of the crime, a range can be 
assigned to probable cause.  Professor Ronald Bacigal proposes quantifying probable cause into 
a range of 40% to 49% for precisely this reason.
236
  Even providing a range to probable cause 
would add more uniformity to the inquiry and assist judges in better assessing quantifiable 
evidence presented as part of the probable cause inquiry.   
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As more quantifiable evidence is incorporated into the probable cause inquiry, either 
voluntarily or through judicial fiat, courts must grapple seriously with how they assess that 
evidence.  Courts often make the mistake of presuming that certain fallible investigative devices 
are sufficient to establish probable cause without evidence of their reliability.  Or, if accuracy 
rates are admitted as evidence to demonstrate reliability, courts often do not understand how to 
evaluate these accuracy rates to best answer the probable cause question.  This article has 
endeavored to explain which types of evidence require accuracy rates, how to calculate and 
assess those accuracy rates, and finally how to approach the probable cause inquiry using 
quantifiable evidence.  In the process, it has argued that probable cause should be assigned a 
numerical value in cases where quantifiable evidence is the critical basis on which probable 
cause is satisfied.  Much more discussion on this topic is needed, but this paper has outlined 
many of the important issues. 
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